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in 1916, henry Ford faced a legal battle with shareholders in Ford
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Motor Company (including, most notably, the Dodge brothers) over a
plan to end the company’s practice of giving special dividends.1 The
Dodge brothers wanted to force the company to continue giving special
dividends and Ford wanted to end the practice in order to use the cash to
expand operations.2 Ford, who was the President of the company, said
his motivation for this shift was “to employ still more men, to spread
the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to
help them build up their lives and their homes.”3 While the Michigan
Supreme Court would eventually rule against him, Ford’s plan was
simple: share the success with workers through higher wages and more
hiring, and with customers through less expensive cars which will earn
their loyalty and their business.4 More than ninety-five years later,
Howard Schultz, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Starbucks, appeared
on the Piers Morgan Show and asked American corporations and
executives to realize the same principle—that “success is best when it’s
shared.”5 In the same interview, Schultz implored CEOs of American
companies to put short-term profits aside and use company funds to
invest in the long-term success of their country and their companies,
claiming that the private sector “can’t wait for Washington” to act to
fix the ailing U.S. economy.6 Given the state of the economy and the
unseemly growth in executive compensation while employee wages
and job growth remain stagnant,7 it is now Washington who cannot
wait to act.
This Article suggests that a first step towards action ultimately rests
on the simple premise that the fruits of any successful endeavor must
be shared equitably with those who gave their effort to bring about
that success. In this context, equity requires that the profits of large
corporate enterprises should be shared according to some positive
relationship with the risk of loss and the responsibility for success.
Working from that premise, it is unacceptable that the profits of large
corporate enterprises are currently shared by a few and the losses are
* J.D. Candidate, The George Washington Law School, 2013; B.A., University of St. Thomas, 2010.
Many thanks to Professor Neil Buchanan whose insight and guidance were instrumental. Much
gratitude to family and friends for their support and debate.
1
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 474 (1919).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 505.
4
See id. at 508 (holding that when a board of directors acts with a philanthropic motive that only
incidentally benefits shareholders, the court should step in and protect the immediate interests of
the shareholders).
5
Interview by Piers Morgan with Howard Schultz, Chairman, President & CEO, Starbucks
Coffee Company, on Piers Morgan Tonight (Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1203/21/pmt.01.html.
6
Id.
7
Matt Krantz & Barbara Hansen, CEO Pay Soars While Workers’ Pay Stalls, USA Today, Apr. 4, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/story/CEO-pay-2010/45634384/1.
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spread amongst the many.8 The chief culprit in bringing about such an
unacceptable state of affairs is the unchecked and undisrupted growth
of executive compensation.9 This Article argues that in order to reduce
the current inequities of the compensation of executives as compared
to employees, Congress should tax the earnings of executives in excess
of 100 times that of the average employee at a rate of 90%. Such a tax
will help to reduce the grossly disparate inequality of earnings between
executives and average employees because executives will either make
less money after taxes, will negotiate smaller compensation packages,
or average employees will be paid more.
The text that follows consists of four main parts. Part I reviews the
current executive compensation tax scheme as it relates to executive
salaries. Part II then reviews the current executive compensation tax
scheme as it relates to non-salary compensations. Part III details the
shortcomings of the current executive compensation tax scheme.
Part IV then argues that executive compensation should be deemed
excessive if it surpasses 100 times the gross yearly wages of the average
employee. Additionally, Part IV argues that executive compensation
regulation through the tax code is best met by imposing a large
individual tax burden on executive compensation. In conclusion, this
Article contrasts this proposed legislation scheme by comparing it to
the current executive compensation tax scheme.
I. The Current State of Tax Treatment of Excessive Salaries
There are several provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
that attempt to limit and regulate executive compensation, but these
provisions fall short of success.10 The provisions have targeted wages in
general, incentive-based pay, and large payments made to executives
who are leaving the company (often called “golden parachute
payments”).11 These options have been largely fruitless in reigning in
executive compensation and it is important to understand where they
fall short.12
See Jena McGregor, Crazy Data Point of the Day: How Much CEO Pay vs. Worker Pay Has Grown,
Post Leadership (May 11, 2012, 1:48 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-leadership/
post/crazy-data-point-of-the-day-how-much-ceo-vs-worker-pay-has-grown/2012/05/11/
gIQArUISIU_blog.html.
9
See id.
10
See, e.g., Pamela F. Olson, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, S. Fin. Cmte. Testimony, Apr. 8,
2003, 6–7, available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040803potest.pdf (detailing
the role of the tax code in regulating executive compensation in the context of the Enron
investigation).
11
Id.
12
See generally, Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation
Through the Tax Code, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 486, 490-91 (June 2009).
8
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A. IRC Section 162(a)(1) Limits Wage Deductions to Wages that
are Reasonable but Has Not Been Applied in the Context of
Large Corporations
Congress has directed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to attempt
to regulate executive wages directly with two provisions in the tax code.13
The first provision is IRC § 162(a)(1), which only allows a deduction
for wages that are reasonable.14 Courts have fashioned a two-prong
test to determine whether wages are deductible under § 162.15 First,
the payments have to be intended as wages, and second, the amount
of compensation has to be reasonable under all circumstances of the
business.16 To determine whether compensation is reasonable under
all circumstances, courts have adopted a multifactor test that lists
circumstances relevant to the issue of reasonableness.17 The multifactor
test, as laid out in Elliotts Inc. v. Commissioner,18 includes the following:
(1) the employee’s role in the company, (2) the compensation paid to
similarly situated employees in similar companies, (3) the character
and condition of the company, (4) whether a conflict of interest exists,
and (5) the consistency of the payments.
While some have argued that § 162(a)(1) should be used to limit
the compensation paid to employees of all corporations, the IRS
has only invoked this particular provision when it is attempting to
recharacterize payments made to owners of closely held corporations
as nondeductible expenditures.19 For example, assume a corporation
is owned and operated by one person who pays himself a wage. That
wage is deductible to the corporation and is only taxed as wages to
the individual.20 If the wage is unreasonable in amount then the IRS
can argue that a portion of it should be characterized as a dividend,
I.R.C. §§ 162(a)(1), (m).
I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
15
E.g., Summit Publishing Inc. v. Comm’r, 59 T.C. 833, 835 (1990).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983); but see Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm’r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th
Cir. 1999) (arguing that the multifactor test “does not provide adequate guidance to a rational
decision” and adopting an “independent investor test” that relies on a company’s return on
equity calculation to determine reasonable compensation). The independent investor test looks at
a corporation’s return on equity and asks if an independent investor would be satisfied with such
a return. In Menard Inc. v. Commissioner, the circuit court overturned a Tax Court ruling that $20
million was unreasonable compensation based on the company’s return on equity. See 560 F.3d
620, 628 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the court largely ignored evidence about how the executive’s
efforts created the company’s profits and evidence regarding similarly situated companies and
executives. Other circuits have used the “independent investor” standard to supplement, rather
than supplant, the Elliotts, Inc. factors. See, e.g., Beiner Inc. v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 297 (2004).
19
See Aaron Zelinsky, Comment, Taxing Unreasonable Compensation: § 162(a)(1) and Managerial
Power, 119 Yale L.J., 637, 639 (2009).
20
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1).
13
14
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which is not deductible to the corporation. In that event, the amount is
taxed as profit to the corporation at the time that it is earned and then
taxed again as a dividend when it is distributed.21 So, if a company
pays a compensation package that violates the reasonableness terms
of § 162(a)(1), the corporation is unable to deduct the portion of the
payment that is unreasonable.22
B. IRC Section 162(m) Specifically Targets Executive Wages but
Does Not Limit Incentive-Based Pay
IRC § 162(m) is specifically targeted at executive wages in publicly
traded corporations and disallows a deduction to the corporation for
wages paid in excess of $1 million.23 In 1993, § 162(m) was enacted as
an attempt to reign in executive compensation that, even then, was
considered out of control.24 Since its enactment, § 162(m) has been
popular for noting the failure of the tax code to have any deterring
effect on executive compensation.25 It includes a provision that allows
compensation of over $1 million to be deemed reasonable if the
compensation was awarded for meeting performance goals, called
incentive-based pay.26
In order to avoid the $1 million limit, a performance goal needs
to be pre-established and objective, but it does not need to be based
on a positive business result.27 While a performance goal that is
“substantially certain” to occur is not eligible for the incentive-based pay
exclusion from § 162(m), a goal that is merely easy to attain is eligible.28
Ultimately, if compensation is not tied to a performance-based goal,
such as the structure of incentive-based pay, or is tied to one that is not
substantially certain to occur, the corporation is unable to deduct any
compensation over $1 million.29 Accordingly, incentive-based pay has
become the dominant form of executive compensation in America.30
See, e.g., Charles McCandless Tile Serv. v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 108, 112 (1970).
Id.
23
I.R.C. § 162(m) (“In the case of any publicly held corporation, no deduction shall be allowed
under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee
to the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such
employee exceeds $1,000,000.”).
24
Keith Epstein & Eamon Javers, How Bill Clinton Helped Boost CEO Pay, Bloomberg Businessweek,
Nov. 26, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_48/b4011079.htm; see also
Gemma Lee & Hongfei Tang, CEO Pension and Deferred Compensation (Jan. 30, 2011), available at
http://business.gwu.edu/finance/seminar/lee-tang-1-30-2011.pdf (draft article, Stillman School of
Business, Seton Hall University).
25
Epstein & Javers, supra note 24.
26
I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C).
27
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i)–(ii).
28
Id. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vii); see also Epstein & Javers, supra note 24.
29
I.R.C. § 162(a), (m).
30
See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 76 Fed. Reg. 72 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011)
21
22
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II. The Current State of Tax Treatment of Non-Salary
Compensation

A. IRC Sections 421–24 Offers Incentives to Executives to
Accept Incentive-Based Pay Arrangements that Follow the
Statutory Rules
The term “incentive-based pay” refers to payments to employees,
usually high level and thus highly compensated employees, for reaching
certain goals or, commonly, for improving the company’s financial
position.31 It can come in many forms, such as simple cash payments,
statutory incentive stock options (ISOs), nonstatutory incentive stock
options (NSOs), or phantom stock options.32 Stock options bestow
upon the recipient the right to purchase stock at a certain price (the
‘exercise price’).33 If the stock increases in value beyond the exercise
price (presumably because of the good stewardship of the company’s
executives) then the recipient is able to purchase stock at a discounted
price.34 If the stock decreases in value, then the option will not be
exercised (meaning the recipient will not purchase the stock at the
exercise price) because the holder of the option would not purchase
stock at a higher price than he or she could purchase it on the open
market.35
Statutory ISOs are options, granted pursuant to IRC §§ 421–424,
which grant tax benefits to the recipients.36 The main allure of ISOs
is that they do not result in recognition of income—meaning the
recipient will not be taxed on the option when it is granted or when
it is exercised.37 Instead, the recipient can defer recognizing the ISO
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 372(g)) (stating that incentive-based compensation is “any variable
compensation that serves as an incentive for performance); see also Carola Frydman & Dirk
Jenter, CEO Compensation (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/4
6273/1/64411777X.pdf (working paper, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University) (explaining several ways that
corporations structure executive compensation to attempt to incentivize executives to take actions
that benefit shareholders).
31
See Frydman & Jenter, supra note 30, at 9 (“Executive compensation can be used to alleviate
the agency problem by aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders. In principle, an
executive’s pay should be based on the most informative indicator(s) for whether the executive
has taken actions that maximize shareholder value.”).
32
See Types of Employee Stock Options, CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/
money101/lesson10/index4.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2013); see also Stock Options, Restricted Stock,
Phantom Stock, Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs), and Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs), Nat’l.
Ctr. For Emp. Ownership, http://www.nceo.org/articles/stock-options-restricted-phantom-sarsespps (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Types of Options].
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
H.R. Rep. 108-755, at 786 (2004).
37
I.R.C. § 421(a)(1).
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income until he or she sells the stock.38 Deferring income recognition
allows the recipient of stock options to avoid paying a tax before he
or she has sold the stock for cash, thereby avoiding having to sell the
stock to pay a tax or paying the tax out of the recipient’s personal
funds.39 Additionally, deferral allows a recipient to take advantage of
the time value of money.40 The basic concept is that, due to inflation
and the potential to earn interest, a dollar is worth more today than
it will be years later.41 Therefore, paying tax with today’s money is
more expensive than paying tax with tomorrow’s money.42 Finally,
the recipient can recognize capital gain when he or she sells the stock,
which is taxed at a lower rate, rather than recognizing the value of the
option as wages, which are taxed at a higher rate, when it is granted or
exercised.43 In this case, the employer is not able to take a deduction for
the options granted until they are exercised.44
NSOs, on the other hand, include all other stock options that are not
granted pursuant to IRC §§ 421–24.45 The tax treatment of these options
is instead governed by IRC § 83, as are phantom stock options and
simple cash bonuses. Phantom stock options are not really options at
all because the recipient does not receive the ability to purchase stock.46
He or she is simply given a cash bonus amounting to the difference
between an imagined exercise price and the actual price of the stock
when the bonus is due to be paid.47 For example, if an executive signs
his or her contract when the stock price is $10, he or she may be given
a cash bonus that amounts to the difference between $10 (the imagined
exercise price) and whatever the stock price is at the time the bonus is
to be paid.48
IRC § 83 makes options taxable to the employee when they are
granted if there is an ascertainable value to the option.49 If there is no
ascertainable value to the stock options (meaning there is no market
price available for the options) then the options are taxed as ordinary
Id.
Margaret Collins, Deferred Compensation Lets Executive Avoid 401(K) Savings Caps, Bloomberg,
(June 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-29/deferred-compensation-letsexecutives-avoid-401-k-saving-caps.html.
40
Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money,” 95 Yale L.J. 506, 539–41
(1986).
41
Id. at 517.
42
Id. at 539.
43
I.R.C. § 421(a)(2).
44
Id.
45
E.g., I.R.S Internal Memo No. 20094301F (Oct. 23, 2009).
46
See Types of Options, supra note 32.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
I.R.C. § 83(a).
38
39
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income when they are exercised.50 In the case of phantom stock options
or simple cash bonuses, the cash payments are taxed as ordinary income
when the money is received.51 In these scenarios, the payment of cash
or the grant of options is deductible to the company when ordinary
income would be recognized by the recipient.52
B. IRC Sections 4999 & 280G Impose Stringent Penalties on
Corporations and Executives but Only in the Limited Arena of
Golden Parachute Payments
The term “golden parachute payment” is widely believed to have
originated with a man named Charles Tillinghast, who was the chairman
of Trans World Airlines (TWA).53 At the time he was hired, TWA was in
financial trouble and, to obtain Tillinghast’s services, it promised him
large cash payments if he lost his job.54 Tillinghast was able to turn TWA
around, however, and never got his golden parachute payment.55 The
practice of using golden parachute payments expanded significantly in
the 1980s as a large wave of hostile takeovers led executives to request
and receive contracts that paid them large bonuses if they should lose
their jobs following a change in control of the corporation.56 Finding
this behavior to be unacceptable, Congress chose to act with provisions
in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which enacted IRC §§ 280G and
4999. 57
Sections 280G and 4999 were meant to work in tandem to deter
corporations from offering excessive golden parachute payments.58 IRC
§ 280G disallows a deduction to corporations for payments made under
a golden parachute payment contract and § 4999 imposes an additional
20% tax on payments received by an executive under a golden parachute
payment contract. These code provisions define golden parachute
payments as contracts that provide for payment that (1) is contingent
on a change of control of a corporation or its assets, and (2) is more than
three times the average yearly compensation paid by the corporation
to the executive over the last five years.59 The Emergency Economic
I.R.S. Publication 525 (2011).
I.R.C. § 83.
52
I.R.C. § 162(a).
53
Claire Suddath, Biggest Golden Parachutes, Time Lists, http://www.time.com/time/specials/
packages/article/0,28804,1848501_1848500_1848418,00.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Peer C. Fiss et al., How Golden Parachute Payments Unfolded: Diffusion and Variation of a
Controversial Practice (Aug. 24, 2011), available at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~markkenn/papers/
FissKennedyDavis_2012F.pdf (forthcoming in Organization Science).
57
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369.
58
Yocum v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 579, 583 (2005).
59
I.R.C. § 280G(a).
50
51
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Stabilization Act of 2008 expanded the definition of golden parachute
payments for firms who had taken bailout funds.60 For those firms
and their executives, golden parachute payments include payments
that were made in severance of employment generally instead of only
payments made in severance of employment after change in control of
a corporation or its assets.61
III. Shortcomings of the Current Statutory Scheme
A. Corporate Tax Incidence Must be Born by People,
not Corporations in the Abstract
No serious discussion of the success of the current executive
compensation taxation scheme can avoid the subject of corporate tax
incidence. As detailed above, the majority of tax laws aiming to reign
in executive compensation choose to impose negative consequences
on the corporation.62 Corporations, contrary to the musings of certain
public figures and the suggestions of certain Supreme Court decisions,63
are legal entities and not natural people.64 They are incapable of paying
taxes (as well as other essential human functions) and the burden
of paying taxes ultimately falls on people. There are three possible
groups of people who can be ultimately held responsible for bearing
the corporate tax burden (those who bear the “tax incidence”) and
they are (1) laborers, through decreased salaries and layoffs, (2) capital
contributors, such as shareholders, or (3) customers, through increased
prices or lower quality products.65 When one of the code provisions is
invoked to limit executive compensation, it is not the corporation in
the abstract that is punished but one of the aforementioned groups of
people.66
Among academics who study the corporate tax incidence, there
Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
Id.
62
Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
877, 881 (2007).
63
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 322 (2010) (analyzing the free speech rights of corporations
as if they were natural people even though they are just legal entities); see also Adam Schiff, The
Supreme Court Still Thinks Corporations Are People, Atlantic (July 18, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2012/07/the-supreme-court-still-thinks-corporations-are-people/259995/;
Jack Welch & Suzy Welch, It’s True: Corporations Are People, Wall St. J., (Jul. 15, 2012), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303740704577524823306803692.html.
64
Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 Yale L.J. 325, 332
(1995).
65
See generally R. Alison Felix, Passing the Burden: Corporate Tax Incidence in Open Economies at 1
(Oct. 2007) (unpublished article by an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City); see
also Cong. Budget Office, The Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax (1996).
66
See Mullane, supra note 12, at 534.
60
61
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is no consensus on which group bears the brunt of the burden.67 For
purposes of this Article, while it may be an intriguing question, it does
not matter which group is mostly responsible; it matters only that
neither the executives nor the fictional corporation bear the incidence
of corporate taxes.68 A corporation cannot be held responsible because
the corporate form is a legal form and exists solely to give investors
and decision makers protection from the risks of doing business.69 In
exchange for this mitigation of risk (though, investors and decision
makers still risk their investments and their jobs) society collects the
benefits of easier entrepreneurship and investment.70 Society does not
get the benefit of a non-human entity paying taxes without consequence
to its stakeholders.71
Executives, on the other hand, are slightly harder to pin down.
Thanks to incentive-based pay, many corporate executives are also
shareholders, and therefore bear some of the tax incidence in that
role.72 They are also employees, and could bear some of the corporate
tax incidence in that role.73 The best example of that is found within
§162(m), which limits executives’ wages to $1 million. Of course, with
the prevalence of incentive-based pay and golden parachute payments,
it would be laughable to propose that corporate executives bear any
of the corporate tax incidence through lower salaries or layoffs like
traditional employees. Importantly, while executives reap incredible
benefits in their role as executives, they do not bear a corresponding
burden of the tax incidence for that particular role. So, while executives
may bear some of the corporate tax burden in their roles as shareholders
and employees, they are more than well compensated (in the form of
incentive-based pay, high wages, and golden parachute payments) for
that burden in their role as executives, a role for which they do not bear
a corresponding tax burden.
B. The Current Tax Scheme is Too Weak to Act as a Deterrent
The current tax scheme attempts to either decrease the afterAlan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know (Sept. 15, 2005), available
at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/bearstax.pdf (unpublished article that was presented at the
NBER Tax Policy & the Economy Conference).
68
Id.; Mullane, supra note 12, at 502 (“[A]rtificial legal entities, such as corporations, can only act
through natural persons . . . . A corporation cannot bear the burden (or incidence) of taxes; only
natural persons can bear the economic burden.”).
69
Karen E. Klein, Protecting Your Personal Assets, Businessweek (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.
businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/feb2009/sb20090212_214790.htm.
70
Id.
71
See Mullane, supra note 12, at 502.
72
See Auerbach, supra note 67, at 5.
73
See id. at 10.
67
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tax profits of a corporation or decrease the after-tax earnings of the
executive.74 Through IRC §§ 162(a)(1), 162(m), and 280G, the tax code
either imposes a penalty or denies a deduction to the corporation.75
Alternatively, § 4999 imposes a penalty on executives receiving golden
parachute payments.76 Sections 421–24 do not impose any penalty on the
executive or the company, but rather provide tax benefits to executives
if their incentive-based compensation plans follow the rules of those
sections.77 In sum, there are three code sections that impose a penalty
on corporations and only one that imposes a penalty on executives, but
even then, only in the limited context of golden parachute payments.
The theory behind the sections penalizing the corporation is that
they will lead to decreased profits and therefore corporate boards of
directors will be less inclined to offer compensation packages that
run afoul of those sections.78 Practically, however, these sections
contain loopholes that allow boards of directors to draft compensation
agreements in any amount without being subject to the penalty or losing
the deduction.79 In the case of § 162(m), boards of directors can simply
replace wages with easy to obtain incentive-based compensation;
and § 280G is only applicable in narrow circumstances that can, again,
be avoided by careful drafting.80 While § 162(a)(1) could be used to
limit executive compensation in large corporations, the IRS only uses
the section to limit the ability of closely held companies to deduct
wages.81 These loopholes simply make these sections too weak to have
any deterrent effect. While Congress could easily fix the loopholes
and rewrite § 162(a)(1) to force the IRS to use it to limit deductions for
wages in the public corporation setting, there will still be the problem
that individuals still need to shoulder the corporate tax incidence.
The theory behind § 4999 and §§ 421–24 is that executives will be
less likely to accept compensation packages that cannot conform to
those code sections. Practically, however, § 4999 is only available in
the limited setting of golden parachute payments and §§ 421–24 do
not impose any penalty at all, but attempt to entice executives to use
incentive-based compensation in a manner that conforms to those
Id. at 5.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (allowing a deduction only for wages that are reasonable); id. § 162(m) (limiting
executive salaries to $1 million); id. § 280G (imposing a ten percent excise tax on golden parachute
payments).
76
I.R.C. § 4999.
77
I.R.C. §§ 421–24.
78
Polsky, supra note 62, at 890.
79
See, e.g., id. at 891.
80
Andrew C.W. Lund, Tax’s Triviality As A Pay-Reforming Device, 57 Villanova L. Rev. 571, 575
(2012).
81
Zelinsky, supra note 19, at 639.
74
75
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sections.82 Accordingly, executives are not subject to the penalty tax
of § 4999 in many circumstances and simply accept qualified (under
§§ 421–24) incentive-based compensation to the extent they can before
accepting additional nonqualified incentive-based compensation.83
Additionally, any lost benefit to the executive or penalty imposed on
the executive can be ameliorated if a corporation agrees to gross-up an
executive’s compensation package.84
“Grossing-up” is a common occurrence in salary negotiations.85 An
executive wants to be paid a certain amount after taxes, such as after
§ 4999’s 20% tax or the loss of the benefits bestowed by §§ 421–24, and
a corporation takes that amount and grosses-up to come to a salary
figure that will pay the executive his requested after-tax amount.86
Essentially, through grossing-up, the corporation pays the extra tax,
instead of the executive, and § 4999’s attempt to deter executives from
requesting parachute payments and §§ 421–424’s attempts to entice
executives into certain incentive-based pay arrangements fail.87
It is assumed that the problem of grossing-up executive
compensation—so that executives do not lose any tax benefits or face
any tax penalties—is solved through the arm’s length negotiating
process.88 The theory is that corporate boards will not want to gross-up
because that would be against shareholder interests.89 Boards represent
shareholders who want to keep compensation levels low to maximize
return on their investments.90 Executives want their compensation
levels high because it is in their interest to make as much money as
possible.91 Furthermore, if a board is offering unacceptable (or excessive)
compensation, it will be replaced by the shareholders.92
This thinking has two main flaws. First, a member on a board of
James M. Bickley, Employee Stock Options: Tax Treatment and Tax Issues, CRS 2 (June 15, 2012)
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31458.pdf.
83
Lund, supra note 80, at 574.
84
Len Boselovic, Executive Jet Use, ‘Gross ups’ Alive, Well, Pittsburgh Post–Gazette, Mar. 30, 2012,
available at http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/business/news/executive-jet-use-gross-ups-alivewell-298750/.
85
Id.
86
Frederick D. Lipman & Steven E. Hall, Executive Compensation Best Practices 89 (John
Wiley & Sons 2008).
87
See id.
88
Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. of Econ.
Perspective 71, 72 (2003).
89
See Mullane, supra note 12, at 513–14.
90
Id. at 536.
91
Id. at 513.
92
See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter Pay Without
Performance].
82

Vol. 5.2

Legislation & Policy Brief

211

directors is likely to have a skill set similar to an executive because of the
skills required to make top-level business decisions.93 In fact, a corporate
board of directors is usually comprised of many executives. In either
event, it is in board members’ individual best interests to ensure that
compensation levels paid to executives are as high as possible because
their own skills or services will be more valuable.94 This is the same
interest as the executive and, when parties have the same interests,
they are not negotiating at arm’s length.95 Second, shareholders are
often a poor guard against excessive compensation.96 As a group, they
are often large, disorganized, and only indirectly (through pension
managers or stock brokers) involved in the decision making process.97
While executives may not get everything they want in compensation
negotiations, the fact that they share many of the same self-interests
as corporate boards, and that shareholders are a poor guard against
excessive compensation, certainly gives them a lot of leverage.
The heart of the injustice in executive compensation is that, while
economic times are good, executives are paid handsomely and laborers
are, at best, paid adequately. When the company takes a turn for the
worse, however, executives continue to receive large salaries and
workers are laid off.98 Nowhere has this been more evident than during
the 2008 Financial Crisis. With wages essentially stagnant and a high
number of citizens unemployed, executive pay rose a whopping 27%
in 2010 from already high levels in 2009.99 The same companies who
apparently lack the financial wherewithal to raise wages or hire new
workers at the lowest levels and salaries of their business, have found
the means to reward executives with incredible raises. Additionally,
companies who cut benefits for employees because of the claimed
expense continue to pay for perks, such as free tax preparation or
personal use of corporate jets, for their executives. It is unacceptable
for the American workforce to be exploited in this manner. It is equally
unacceptable for the American workforce to devote efforts to creating
the profits that pay executive salaries (and to suffer the cost of layoffs
when times turn bad), and then not be able to share in those profits.
Therefore, it is important that the tax be levied against the right person.
Id. at 65.
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IV. The Proposed Solution

With tax laws aimed at curbing executive compensation, the
question of how corporate executives are continually allowed to
consume extravagant compensation packages remains. The current
tax scheme seeks to increase the tax incidence on corporations and
executives who agree to excessive compensation packages by enough
of a margin to discourage such activity but has failed to successfully
discourage the behavior.100 The current scheme suffers from two fatal
flaws. First, the tax laws generally reduce the after tax incidence of the
wrong party. Second, the scheme is too weak to have a deterrent effect.
A. Goals of a New Tax Scheme
The hodgepodge of taxing options and their collective impotence
in curbing excessive executive compensation has left many unsatisfied
with the state of executive compensation,101 and many others
wondering if the tax code is the right vehicle for curbing excessive
executive compensation at all.102 Since the tax code has been impotent
when it comes to curbing executive compensation, other areas of the
law should be considered to accomplish that goal.103 The provisions
seeking to limit executive compensation, however, have flaws that
are correctable.104 This Article has argued that the provisions outlined
above are either so lenient as to have no deterring effect, or they are
aimed at the wrong taxpayer. Furthermore, using the tax code provides
an opportunity to avoid direct regulation that could negatively affect
the ability of companies to exercise free business judgment in deciding
what to pay executives. Thus, any attempt to regulate executive
compensation through the tax code should (1) be significant enough
to have a deterring effect, (2) be aimed at the right taxpayer, and (3)
protect the free exercise of business judgment.
1. Creating a Tax Law that is Strong Enough to be a Deterrent
A revised tax scheme should effectively deter such excessive
compensation packages from being offered and accepted. Here,
the lessons from the many failed attempts to regulate executive
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See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, And, If So, What If Anything Should
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compensation through the tax code will be of a great help. First, those tax
laws which attempt to penalize the corporation—for example § 280G,
§ 162(a)(1), and § 162(m)—have failed because the corporation is either
willing to pay the tax penalty, able to offer compensation packages
that avoid the penalty altogether, or the IRS does not use the statute
to reduce executive compensation in the public corporation setting.
Second, attempts to entice executives to refuse excessive compensation
packages through beneficial treatment or through penalties have
failed because executives are not willing to limit themselves to only
tax beneficial compensation and they can request that the corporation
structure the compensation package to account for the tax penalty. To be
a strong deterrent against excessive executive compensation packages,
a new tax scheme needs to not only be free from loopholes but the
rates also need to be high enough to discourage artfully structuring the
package so that the corporation bears the burden.
To ensure that the new tax scheme is free from loopholes, it will be
important to define the term “executive compensation” as broadly as
possible. As was discovered with § 162(m), if one element of executive
compensation is exempt from the tax then executive compensation
will simply gravitate towards that element. When Congress enacted
§ 162(m), it exempted incentive-based pay and now the vast majority of
the excessive compensation packages are structured around incentivebased pay.
In a new tax provision, the term “executive compensation” should
include every benefit a corporation bestows upon an executive. In
addition to wages and incentive-based pay, this should include any
perk such as retirement packages, stock options, private use of corporate
assets like planes or property, and free tax preparation. Corporations
should still be free to offer, and executives free to accept, these forms
of compensation, but if their collective value exceeds 100 times that of
the compensation package offered to the average employee, then the
executive must pay the 90% tax.
2. Creating a Tax Law that is Aimed at the Right Taxpayer
For a tax law to be effective at changing behavior, the tax incidence
must be placed on the person or party making decisions regarding
that behavior. For corporations, it is traditionally assumed that the
corporate board of directors is the party that ultimately decides what
the compensation package for executives will include.105 In a traditional
arm’s length negotiation, the board of directors would either pay a salary
105
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that an executive candidate is willing to accept or will find another
executive candidate that is willing to work for less compensation.106
As mentioned previously, however, executives and boards of directors
do not actually negotiate in a traditional arm’s length manner and the
executive has more power to decide his or her own compensation.107
Indeed, under the traditional arm’s length negotiation model
corporations do not need additional encouragement to keep executive
compensation low.108 The interest of the corporation is always to make
executive compensation as low as possible, while still obtaining and
retaining top talent. Imposing additional penalties on the corporation,
which would actually be borne by capital-contributors, laborers, and
customers, will not aid in the effort to reduce executive compensation
because these groups are already properly incentivized to do just that.
The problem is that those groups simply do not have enough control
over executive compensation negotiations to keep them in check.
Laborers and customers usually do not even have a seat at the table
during negotiations. Boards of directors represent capital-contributors
and have self-interests that are more aligned with the executive than
with shareholders or customers. Essentially, due to the amount of
the executive’s control over the negotiation and lack of control by the
alternative bearers of the tax incidence, the current tax law is trying to
alter the executive’s behavior by taxing the corporation.
3. Creating a Tax Law that Protects the Free Exercise of
Business Judgment
In many ways the inherent nature of a tax accomplishes this goal.
A tax makes an activity more expensive but does not wholly forbid
the activity the way a direct regulation might.109 This allows individual
actors the freedom to exercise discretion in deciding whether the activity
is worth its expected reward. For example, a tax would not accomplish
this goal if the tax rate were 100%. In that case, the character of the tax
is much more like a direct regulation that, for example, places a ceiling
on compensation. Essentially, it is important for the new tax scheme to
maintain its integrity as a tax and avoid serving as a direct regulation
in order to protect the free exercise of business judgment.
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 88, at 73.
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B. Two Balancing Questions
Finding the right definition of “excessive” executive compensation
and the right rate at which to tax it requires balancing the aforementioned
goals of a new tax scheme. First, this new tax scheme needs to define
excessive executive compensation in a way that preserves the strength
of the law but does not take away the ability of corporations to offer,
or of executives to accept, any compensation level that the two parties
feel properly compensates and incentivizes an executive. Second, this
new tax scheme needs to find a rate of tax that is strong enough to be a
deterrent and prevents corporations from grossing-up compensation,
but does not completely prevent an executive from receiving at least a
portion of every dollar earned.
1. Finding the Right Definition of “Excessive”
a. Finding the Right Reference Point
The point at which executive compensation becomes excessive is
essentially important for any law seeking to curb excessive executive
compensation.110 There are several options available for determining
when executive compensation becomes excessive.111 First, a new tax
scheme could define excessive compensation in relation to the thencurrent market rate of pay. For example, a new law could say that
executive compensation becomes excessive when it is greater than 10%
of the then-current market rate of pay for the executive’s position. The
amount of control executives enjoy over their individual compensation
levels, however, means that executives have a lot of control over the
market rate of executive pay. Accordingly, defining excessive executive
compensation by referencing the then-current market rate of pay gives
executives too much control over the definition of “excessive” and
would significantly weaken a potential new tax law.
Alternatively, the new tax scheme could define excessive executive
compensation by referencing a set amount.112 For example, a new law
could say that executive compensation becomes excessive when it is
greater than $10 million. This option, however, would decrease the
ability of firms to freely exercise their business judgment in deciding
what to pay and how to properly incentivize their executives.
Posner, supra note 101, at 1014.
Id. at 1015–16.
112
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Accordingly, this Article suggests defining excessive executive
compensation by referencing the pay of the average employee within
the corporation to determine the rate at which executive compensation
becomes excessive. Referencing what excessive executive compensation
is by using employee compensation as a comparison will protect the free
exercise of business judgment because it will always be a company’s
prerogative to decide on what to compensate the average employee.
Essentially, the company can control the definition of excessive (and
thus can control whether their executives have to pay the additional
tax) by controlling the compensation of the average employee.
Because executives decide employee compensation levels, they
will enjoy a large amount of control over the definition of excessive
executive compensation.113 Referencing the pay of the average worker to
determine excessive compensation, however, means that if executives
exercise their control in a self-serving manner (i.e. increase the amount
of compensation they can receive before it becomes subject to the
penalty tax), they will also be benefiting the average employees by
increasing their pay. This result would address an overarching policy
goal of decreasing inequity in the corporate compensation system.
Indeed, much of the outrage over executive compensation stems from
comparing the amount given to executives to the amount given to the
average employee. So, if employee pay increases with executive pay,
then the perception of injustice within the compensation system will
also decrease.
b. Finding Where Compensation Becomes “Excessive”
The level at which executive compensation exceeds the
compensation of the average employee at a fair amount is a harder
question. Deciding what rate executive compensation can exceed that
of the average employee fairly is, to borrow a phrase from the 2008
Presidential debates, a lot like nailing Jell-O to a wall.114 The mere fact
that nailing down a rate is difficult, however, should not detract from the
important task of restoring equity to corporate compensation schemes.
In this pursuit, there are principles that can be used as guidance.
A recent study finds that executives currently make 185 times (a
ratio of 185:1) that of the average employee.115 Considering that 80%
See Pay Without Performance, supra note 92, at 47.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Morrissey, Courts Should Curb Executive Pay, The Nat’l Law J, Aug. 15, 2011
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of Americans believe that recent executive compensation levels are
too high,116 the level at which executive compensation can exceed
compensation of the average employee must be lower than that.
With 185 times established as the current ceiling, finding a floor is the
next step. One of the main justifications for the greater difference in
executive compensation is that executives bear greater responsibility
for the success of a corporation than the average employee and they are
often more highly educated, skilled, and experienced than the average
employee. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to define excessive
executive compensation as any amount greater than the average
employee (a ratio of 1:1).
Now, finding a rate between 1 and 185 that is potentially “fair”
will necessarily involve some arbitrary line drawing and an acceptable
number may need to be found with some amount of trial and error.
Any legislation going forward, however, needs to employ an amount
between those numbers that not only takes into consideration the
nature of the executive’s position, the skills and assets the executive
brings to the table, and the need to protect the free-exercise of business
judgment, but also contemplates the need to reduce the large inequities
in corporate compensation structures.
This Article suggests that setting the rate that executive pay may
exceed average employee pay at 1:100 before it becomes excessive. This
number is drawn based on the above principles, while still allowing
corporations the freedom to offer very high compensation packages
to their most important employees and for those employees to accept
those packages without fear that it will be deemed excessive. It also
significantly decreases the current inequity of the system.
Defining excessive executive compensation as any amount paid to
an executive that exceeds 100 times that of the average employee will
surely not please everyone. There will certainly be a group who feels
that there is no such thing as excessive executive compensation.117 They
believe that the compensation negotiated between an executive and a
board of directors can never be excessive because it is negotiated at
arm’s-length between parties with competing interests.118
This thinking has several flaws. As discussed above, the interests
of corporate boards and executives are too similar for negotiations to
State of Working America (2011)).
116
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really be at arm’s-length,119 and shareholders are a poor guard against
excessive executive compensation.120 In addition to those significant
problems, the protections mentioned above offer no safeguard to the
non-executive employees of a company. Neither a board of directors’
self-interest nor its fiduciary duty is aligned with ensuring the average
employees share in the profits those employees helped create and the
same certainly holds true with executives.121 Of course, a company
needs to make sure its employees are sufficiently motivated to do a
good job, but that is not the same as making sure that employees share
equitably in the fruits of their labor.122 The latter is a strong interest of
society in general and, therefore, the government.123
Alternatively, others may argue that defining excessive executive
compensation as any amount paid to an executive over 100 times that
of the average employee is too high. Indeed, in recent years several
members of Congress have attempted to introduce legislation that will
cap executive compensation at twenty-five times that of the average
employee.124 Also, in other countries the rate at which executive
compensation eclipses average employee compensation is lower.125
For example, British Petroleum (BP) and Barclays (both corporations
in the United Kingdom) pay executives sixty-three and seventy-four
times that of the average employee, respectively.126 While those who
advance this argument may admit that executives are more important
than the average worker, they may not believe that executives are 100
times more important than a group of employees who are essential to a
corporation being in business.
While one may be sympathetic to this position, there are two
problems with its rationale. First, is that it is very hard, maybe
impossible, to tell just how much more valuable an executive is to a
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corporation than the average employee.127 It is likely impossible to
find a rate that is completely and certainly fair. There is currently no
rationale that will lead to a rate which will certainly be the correct or
fair rate of executive compensation.
Second, the nature of our democratic union is one of compromise.128
Some may believe that there is no such thing as excessive executive
compensation, while others may believe that executives should not be
compensated much, or perhaps any, higher than the average employee.
While it is not unreasonable to feel (as opposed to know) that executive
compensation that is 100 times that of the average employee is excessive
or unfair, it is best to compromise at a position which gives corporations
and executives wide latitude in deciding on compensation schemes.
2. Finding the Right Tax Rate
Similarly, the amount of the tax is also a hard question. Deciding
on an amount sufficient to prevent executives from asking for excessive
compensation plans is not an exact science. There are, however,
principles that can guide us in this decision. First, one of our main
goals is to protect the free exercise of business judgment. This means
that corporations should be able to offer, and executives able to accept,
any compensation package they can agree upon. For that to happen,
the executive must be able to receive from the corporation at least a
portion of any salary he or she negotiates. The aim of this tax scheme
is not to wholly forbid an executive from receiving compensation that
exceeds 100 times that of the average employee; it is simply to strongly
discourage it. Therefore, a tax of 100% of every dollar in excess of
100 times the wage of the average employee would be inappropriate
and the amount of the tax needs to be lower than that. Of course, the
current tax rate of 35% (for wages over $388,500, which most executives
receive)129 is not high enough to act as a deterrent since executives
currently continually request excessive compensation packages while
having to pay that tax rate. Therefore the tax rate needs to be greater
than 35% but less than 100%.
A 90% tax would serve as a strong deterrent for excessive
compensation packages because executives would not reap much
benefit from excessive compensation. Additionally, 90% is steep
enough that it will make it hard for corporations to agree to gross-up
See Morrissey, supra note 119.
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compensation. Also, free exercise of business judgment is still protected
because executives could still receive a portion of any compensation
offered to and accepted by them. They simply have to pay a certain tax
rate on those earnings. Finally, it is important to remember that this
rate can be completely avoided as long as employee salaries increase
comparatively with executive salaries.
If excessive executive compensation has been defined as any amount
paid above 100 times that of the average employee, it will decrease
the current inequity of the corporate compensation system, while still
giving plenty of latitude for corporations and executives to decide on
a compensation package without coming within the terms of the tax.
The tax will be levied on individual executives because corporations
have not shied away from bearing negative tax burdens with regard
to executive compensation and because the expense of a tax levied on
a corporation is born by shareholders, customers, and labor instead of
executives who receive the compensation. The tax will be 90% of every
dollar in compensation that is excessive. This will provide a strong
deterrent for executives against demanding and accepting excessive
executive compensation and will be high enough to avoid corporations
offering to gross-up compensation so that executives do not have to
pay the tax. Overall, using the tax code in this manner will decrease
excessive executive compensation while still allowing corporations
and executives to bargain for any compensation package they desire.
Conclusion
There are many problems with the current scheme of executive
compensation taxation that limit the ability of the tax code to curb
excessive compensation. The current code provisions include too many
loopholes and are generally too weak to act as an effective deterrent.
Additionally, the current tax scheme does not place the tax burden on
the party whose behavior it is trying to change. It too often attempts
to penalize the corporation, or more accurately a corporation’s
shareholders, employees, and customers who ultimately bear the burden
of double taxation, instead of executives who have the lion’s share of
control over salary negotiations. Furthermore, the current tax scheme
relies too heavily on the traditional arm’s length negotiation process to
ensure a reasonable compensation package. The ability and incentive of
the corporate board to meaningfully negotiate a compensation package
that is not excessive simply doesn’t exist. Ultimately, these problems
have combined to produce a wholly ineffective regulatory tax scheme
that fails to meaningfully curb excessive executive compensation.
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In response to these current shortcomings, this Article concludes
that Congress should adopt an entirely new tax scheme that is
free from the aforementioned problems. Such a tax scheme should
recognize that executives hold a disproportionate amount of control
over salary negotiations by reallocating the tax burden to the executive
instead of the corporation, which is how the current tax code is set up.
Additionally, the new tax scheme should exist free from debilitating
loopholes and demand that “compensation” is defined in the broadest
possible terms. This Article proposes that Congress continue to protect
the free exercise of business judgment by avoiding a 100% tax rate;
while at the same time protecting the strength of the tax with a high
rate of 90%. By imposing a 90% tax on amounts earned by executives
that exceed 100 times the average employee, the inequities of the
corporate compensation system will be reduced. If executive salaries
and worker salaries are brought closer together then the inequality in
compensation between the two groups will decrease. Furthermore, if
the worker salary increases proportionately with executive salaries
then both groups will get to share equitably in the continued success
of the firm.
The ultimate goal of the new tax scheme should be to reduce
the inequities in the current system of corporate compensation.
Accomplishing such a goal will advance the principle that those
who work to create profits should get to share equitably in the same.
Executives and employees should share those profits through incomes
that are reasonably proportionate to their efforts to create them.
Accordingly, this goal is not necessarily about wealth redistribution
from those who earn high incomes to those who do not but rather
to prevent wealth redistribution from those who earn low incomes
to those who already earn high incomes. A revised tax scheme that
strongly and effectively deters excessive executive compensation is a
solid first step in that direction.

